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This study attempts to shed light on whether stock price
movements have contributedto recentfluctuations in bank
lending in Japan by examining the historical relationship
between stockpricesandbanklending in thatcountry. It is
found thatprior to the mid-1980s the relationship between
stockprices and bank lending was weak, but subsequently
strengthened considerably. This coincided with a change
in the regulatory environment that encouraged banking
institutions topaymore attention to theircapitalpositions.
Since the late 1980s, fluctuations in stockprices appear to
have made important contributions tofluctuations in bank
lending in Japan.
Japan has experienced unusually sluggish growth in bank
lending in recent years. Following double-digit growth in
the second half of the 1980s, bank lending slackened
markedly as the Japaneseeconomyenteredthe currenteco-
nomic downswing. Nominal loan growthaveraged 3.6per-
cent annually between February 1991 (when the Economic
PlanningAgency's coincidentindexofbusinessconditions
peaked) and May 1993. In contrast, in the three previous
recessions Japan experiencedsince 1977, loan growth aver-
aged nearly 11 percent.1
While the reasons for sluggishcredit and money growth
are not yet fully understood, the timing is suggestive: the
credit slowdown followed a steep decline in the Nikkei
stock price index, which more tha..'1 halved in value since
reaching its peakat theendof1989.2 Indeed, the impactof
such a steep asset price deflation on the Japanese financial
system and on the real economy recently has been the
subject of serious debate. To shed some light on this
question, this article examines the historical relationship
between movements inthe stockprice and banklending in
Japan, and explores whether stock price fluctuations ap-
pearto have contributedto explaining recent sluggish loan
growth.
Changes in stock prices may influence bank lending
through two channels. First, stock price fluctuations may
affect loan demand by signaling changes in future eco-
nomic activity. For example, the decline in the stock price
after 1989 may reflect contractionary influences that lower
loan demand, such as the decline in corporate capital
spending triggered by the slump in final demand, poor
1. In real terms, loan growth fell to 1.2 percent over the same period,
compared to 7.2 percent in the preceding 3 recessions. Note that loan
growth was sluggish even though economic activity picked up for atime
in the first half of 1993. The growth in broad monetary aggregate has
also been sluggish. After expanding at an average annual rate of 11 per-
cent in the late 1980s, nominal M2+CDs growth slowed to 3.7 percent
in 1991 and to 0.6 percent in 1992. Money growth actually turned
negative during the second half of 1992.
2. After closing at ¥38,915 on the last trading day of1989, the Nikkei
225 Stock Average bottomed out at ¥14,309 in August 1992. The index
subsequently traded in the ¥18,000-¥20,000range up to the time this
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corporate earnings, and excess capacity.3 Loan demand in
the recent downturn may have been weakened further by
the need to roll over large amounts ofequity-linked bonds
that Japanese firms issued in the late 1980s and by sharp
declines in land prices.
Second, stock price fluctuations may affect loan supply
by affecting the capital position of banks. This second
channel is potentially ofgreater importance in Japan than,
say, in the U.S., becauseJapanese banks traditionally have
taken significant positions in the equity as well as debt of
the same firm. 4 Under these conditions, a Japanese bank
maybewillingtolendmore when Japanese stockprices are
high or rising, and conversely, to lend less when stock
prices are falling, since the bank can use capital gains on
stocks to cushion itselffrom adverse shocks to assets.
Analysis ofthese demand and supply factors is compli-
cated in part because it is likely that up to the early to
mid-1980s, Japan's regulatory regime tended to dampen
the relationship between stock prices and lending. Up to
that time bank credit was heavily influenced by Bank of
Japan (BOJ) credit guidelines (or "window guidance"),
which limited the ability of banks to adjust lending in
response to market conditions or their capital positions.
Banks in any case had little incentive to pay attention to
theircapitalpositions. Onereason is thatthe governmentis
likely to have cushioned banks from adverse shocks that
mightberelatedto government-sanctionedcredit. Another
reason is that Japanese banks were not subject to explicit
capitaladequacy requirements until the1980s. Underthese
conditions, stock prices would be expected to have little
influence on bank lending.
Two developments in the 1980s are likely to have
strengthened the link between stock prices and lending
in Japan. First, the Bank of Japan deemphasized credit
guidelines and gave Japanese banks more leeway in mak-
ing loan decisions. The primary role of BOJ lending has
been increasingly geared to very short-term adjustments
in the financial market rather than to serve as a means
to (implicitly) guarantee liquidity in the banking system
(Suzuki 1987).
3. See for example the report by the Institute ofFiscal and Monetary
Policy, Japanese Ministry of Finance (1993) and the Bank of Japan
(1992).
4. Until 1987 the legallimiton corporateequity holding by financial in-
stitutions was set at 10 percentofoutstanding shares ofany single firm.
Since then, the limit was lowered to 5 percent. In 1991, close to 45 per-
cent ofthe total number ofcorporate shares outstanding was held by fi-
nancial institutions; about half ofthis share is estimated to be held by
banks. In the U.S., where the Glass-Steagall Act strictly separates
commercial and investment banking, corporate shareholding by banks
is virtually nil.
Second, there was growing international concernin the
early 1980s about weak capital positions of banking in-
stitutions (Cooke 1984). In particular, partly as a result of
the adoption of more stringent capital guidelines in the
U.S. in 1981 and 1983, Japanesebanksthatwereexpanding
theirinternationaloperationsin the 1980sfaced pressure to
strengthen their capital positions, so as to ensure that the
Japanesebanksfaced foreign banksonanevencompetitive
footing. 5 The concern \vith ha..rmonizing capital adequacy
requirements eventually resulted in the drafting of risk-
adjusted capital standards in Basle in December 1987.
These were formally adopted by Japan and otherindustrial
countries in July 1988.
Under the Basle Accord, by 1993 Japanese banks were
to achieve risk-adjustedcapital-to-assetratiosof8percent,
in two tiers. Banks are allowed tocount up to 45 percentof
unrealized gains on equity holdings as Tier II capital. Un-
der these rules, it is possible that during the stock market
boom of the second half ofthe 1980s, rising stock prices
fueled lending to a greater extent than ifbanks could not
hold corporate shares. The subsequent decline in stock
prices may have put the capital of some Japanese banks
near the regulatory floor, thus constraining their loan
supply. One indicator that this effect may have been
important is the strong contraction in hidden reserves (re-
flecting unrealized capital gains) ofcity, long-term credit,
and trustbanks, from a combined total of¥ 55.4trillion in
March 1989 to ¥14.6 trillion in September 1992 (Japanese
Ministry ofFinance 1993).
The possibility appears to be widely recognized that the
Basle capital standards may have strengthened the link
between fluctuations in Japanese stock prices and the
supplyofJapanese banklendinginthe 19808. Forexample,
theJapanese MinistryofFinance (1993) points out that as a
result of the Basle standard, broad fluctuations in asset
prices "couldhave a destabilizing influence on the balance
between fund supply and demand," and that (in the wake
of asset price declines) the Basle standard "could be
making it difficult to expand quantitative lending lev-
els...." Similarly, the Bank of Japan (1992), cites "the
possible negative influence ofBIS capital requirements in
the event ofany further slide in stockprices" on bankloan
decisions. SinceJapanese stock pricesbegandeclining, the
financial press has also focused a greatdeal ofattention on
how such declines would affect the abilityofbanks to meet
their capital requirements under the Basle Accord and the
implications for bank lending behavior.6
5. See Kareken (1984).
6. Fromtime totime the financial press offers estimates ofthe approxi-
mate level of the Nikkei stock price at which the Basle constraintsKIM AND MORENO/ JAPAN: STOCK PRICES AND BANK LENDING 33
To examine therelationship betweenthe stockprice and
bank lending in Japan, we estimate a small vector auto-
regression model ofthe Japanese economy using monthly
data covering two samples: 1970.1-1983.12 and 1984.1-
1992.12. To anticipate the main findings ofthis paper, we
find that in the first period innovations in stock prices are
followed by positive, but very small increases in bank
lending. In contrast, innovations in the stock price are
followed by relativelylarge increases in ba.'lklending inthe
secondperiod. Inline with this, stockprice changes playa
negligiblerole inexplainingfluctuations inbanklendingin
the first period, and a much more important role in the
second period. In particular, stock price increases appear
to have contributed to unexpectedly rapid increases in
lending in the late 1980s and to unexpectedly slow growth
in lending in the early 1990s.
These findings are consistent withthe shiftinthe regula-
tory environment in the 1980s. Prior to the 1980s, banks
attached relatively little importance to the amount of
capital held and government credit guidelines may have
limited their ability to adjust lending fully in response to
shocks to their capital position. Other things equal, this
would have loosened the linkage between stock price and
lending. Growing concern about capital adequacy, even-
tuallyformalized inthe Basle Accord, changedthe rules of
thegame, inducingJapanese banks to pay more attentionto
their capital position. The unexpectedly steep decline in
stock prices appears to have made this new regulatory
constraint binding, or at least ofconcern, for the Japanese
banks during the current economic downturn. However,
because of the wide variety of contractionary influences
affecting the Japanese economy, we cannot rule out slug-
gishdemand as a contributorto the marked decline in loan
growth.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
briefly discuss the possiblelinkbetween stockprice move-
ments and bank lending. We then examine regulatory and
institutional factors in Japan that have affectedthis linkage
and propose some hypotheses. Section III implements the
empirical analysis, followed by concluding remarks in
Section IV.
become binding. These estimates were particularly prevalent in 1992,
when the Nikkei hit a trough. More recently, an article expresses
concern about recent stock price declines in Japan, which are seen as
"... beginning to crimp Japanese banks' ability to lend to business."
(Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1993, p. 1). Nikkei stock price
fluctuations are also believed to have affected the international opera-
tions ofJapanese banks. See Terrell (1993).
II. THE LINK BETWEEN STOCK PRICE
FLUCTUATIONS AND BANK LENDING
As the mechanism by which fluctuations in stock prices
may affect loan demand is relatively straightforward, we
will focus here on clarifying the possible link between
stock price fluctuations and bank loan supply. To discuss
such a link, it is necessary first to examinethe relationship
between bank capital and the supply ofbank loans.7
To serve as a benchmark, the discussion initially ab-
stracts from the role of regulation. We later relax this
assumption and examine how the regulatory and other
institutional environments in Japanese banking may have
strengthened or weakened this capital to loan relationship.
BankCapital andLending
Thebulkofassetsthatintermediariesholdconsistsofloans,
each of which pays off only if the borrower's investment
project succeeds. The deposits that banks collect, by con-
trast, are noncontingent liabilities with a fixed amount of
promised payment, regardless ofthe outcome ofthe pro-
jectsthatthebankfinances. Anunexpecteddropinthe value
of its assets, due to, say, borrowers' investment projects
going awry, may thus force the bank into insolvency.
Banks can cushion themselves against such an adverse
shockby maintainingequity capital. Bernankeand Gertler
(1987) present a model where banks ".voluntarily" adjust
their capital-to-asset ratios to control default risk. Their
model assumes that depositors have imperfect information
onthequalityofabank'sassets, whichprecludes thepossi-
bility ofa payoff to depositors contingent on the return to
the bank's investments. In such a setting, an incentive-
compatiblecontractis for the banktoissue anoncontingent
liability and collateralize it with bank equity capital. Cet-
eris paribus, a greater amount ofcapital allows banks to
issue more deposits and to finance riskier investment pro-
jects. A similarequilibriumcanariseiffinancial distressor
insolvency is costly to the bank. For example, banks may
hold capital because managers value their reputations,
which would be lost in the event ofbank default.
The supply of capital facing banks is not likely to be
perfectly elastic, however. There is a limit, at least in the
short run, to the extent to which capital can be accumu-
lated through retained earnings. Capital market imperfec-
tions such as "lemons" or agency problems will also
constrainbanks' ability to raise capitalthrough new equity
7. Our discussion abstracts from the demand side of the loan market.
For example, to the extent stock prices reflect expectations on future
corporate perfonnance or economic conditions in general, a decline in
stock price will be associated with a decline in loan demand.34 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
issues.8 Given the imperfectly elasticequity capitalthen, a
bank's loan supply can be constrained by its capital posi-
tion. For example, a bank with a low capital-to-assets
ratio-due either to large loan losses or rapid growth in
deposits and loans in the past-may be forced to improve
its capital position by reducing the growth in assets, and
one way to achieve this is to decrease loan growth.
Stock Price Movements
and the Supply ofBank Loans
Upto this point, we have focused ontheratio ofbookvalue
capital to assets as an indicator of bank default risk.
However, the capacity of a bank to absorb adverse shocks
may vary significantly according to its off-balance sheet
characteristics; that is, the market value of the bank's
capital should also be a relevant factor determining bank
risk and hence its loan supply behavior.
To see why, suppose that in addition to risky loans, the
asset side ofthe bank's balance sheet also includes corpo-
rate shares, as is the case in Japan. Changes in the market
value ofthe bank's shareholding clearly willhave abearing
on its default risk. For example, a bank with substantial
unrealized capital gains on its stockholdings will be able
to write off larger amounts of loan losses by selling
the securities and realizing the gains. By implication,
loan supply will be relatively less constrained by book
capital position for banks with sufficiently large "hidden
reserves."
Conversely, a significant decline in stock prices will
expose the bank to a greater amount of default risk than
would be suggested by book capital position alone. Other
things equal, therefore, we would expect a positive rela-
tionship between stock prices and bank lending.9
Regulatory andInstitutional Factors
While theory suggests that capital position should affect
bank loan behavior, the relationship also may be affected
by regulation. A generallyacceptedview inthe U.S. is that
regulation tightens the linkage between bank capital posi-
tion and lending (Keeley 1988, Bernanke and Lown 1991,
Furlong 1992, Peek and Rosengren 1993). Some view the
tightening of linkage through regulation as necessary be-
cause banks, as leveraged enterprises, have an incentive to
8. Asquith and Mullins (1986) show, for example, that a finn's stock
pricedecreases uponannouncementofnew equity issue, suggestingthat
the market discounts a lemons premium.
9.· For purposesofthisdiscussion, itis assumed that stockpricechanges
are sufficiently persistent that they may be treated as pennanent.
undertake more risk at the expense of depositors. The
incentiveproblem is exacerbatedifbankshave access to an
underpriced deposit insurance.10
Until the second halfofthe 1980s, Japanesebanks were
not subject to explicit capital-asset ratio requirements.
Article 5 ofthe Banking Law (1981) stipulates a minimum
bank capitalization of¥1 billion for banks. 11 Although no
liquid asset-to-deposit ratio is imposed·by law, the Minis-
try ofFinancepiovided adirtinistrative guidance that in the
first halfofthe 1980s limitedthe average ratio oflendingto
depositto below 80percent, andmaintainedbankliquidity
ratios above 30 percent. Banks also faced a maximum
lending limit to one borrower: 20 percent of capital and
reserves for city banks and30percentfor long-term credit
and trust banks. However, none ofthese provisions, legal
or informal, directed Japanese banks to maintain some
minimum ratio ofcapital to assets (Hendrie1986).
In fact, throughout most of the postwar period, the
regulatory and institutional environment in Japan appears
to have worked to loosen rather than tighten the linkage
between banks' capital position and lending. First, the
Japanese financial system sought to minimize defaultrisks
offinancial institutions by limitingcompetition. Underthe
so-called "convoy system" governing banking regulation,
the authorities soughtto reduce "destructivecompetition"
andcreate a stablebusinessenvironmentfor banks. To this
end, the domestic financial market was isolated from
foreign competition, and strict controls were applied to
deposit rates, new entry into banking, and separation of
long-term versus short-term finance. 12 Under the convoy
system, all incumbent city banks grew at about the same
pace, earning substantial rents from interest rate spreads
and, tellingly, no financial institution was allowed to fail
throughout the entire postwar period. The implicit social-
ization of risk is likely to have diluted individual banks'
incentive to control riskand contributedto the low capital-
to-asset ratios observed throughout most of the postwar
period.
Second, lending by the BOJ provided a substitute to
bank equity capital as a cushion against shocks to asset
value. In fact, one defining characteristic of the postwar
Japanese financial system is "overloan," which denotes a
chronic tendency of commercial banks to extend more
credit, either by lending orby purchase ofsecurities, than
they acquired from deposits or own capital, with the gap
10. SeeFurlong, (1992) for further discussion.
11. Federation ofBankers Associations ofJapan (1989).
12. See for example Suzuki (1987) and Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard
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filled primarily by relying on borrowing from the BOJ. As
noted by Suzuki (1987, p. 24) "the policies of allowing
over-loan... reduced the banks' consciousness of their
own funding position; that is, there was a diminution of
self-reliance by banks because they were not forced to
adjust total credit granted so long as reserves were avail-
able from the Bank ofJapan. . . ." Third, the dependence
ofcommercial banks on BOJ credit provided leverage for
themonetary authority to influencethe quantity and alloca-
tion of loans by banks under the system of window guid-
ance. By constraining banks' lending decisions, window
guidance would have further weakened the link between
bank capital and lending.
Finally, close supervision and prudential control by the
regulatory authorities provided an effective substitute for
bank capital regulation as a means to control the moral
hazard problem in banking discussed earlier. For example,
in the course of conducting window guidance, the BOJ
closely monitored on adaily basis individual banks' opera-
tions and fund positions. 13The MinistryofFinance (MOF)
also played an instrumental role as monitor, especially in
situations when a bank was judged to be mismanaged and
needed drastic organization and asset restructuring. Typ-
ically, banks undergoing restructuring would be forced to
accept aretiredhigh-ranking MOFbureaucratas an execu-
tive or even as president. Close monitoring of individual
banks was possible to agreater extent inJapan than would
have been possible in the US. because of the relatively
smaller number offinancial institutions. 14
Under the convoy system, Japanese banks pursued a
strategy of aggressively expanding deposits and lending,
paying little heed to capital position (Goldsmith 1983,
Suzuki 1987). For example, throughout most of the rapid
growth period (roughly from the early 1950s to.the early
1970s), the own capital-to-assetratio averaged alittle over
5 percent,15 Excluding various reserves, bank capital has
averaged well under 1percentoftotal assets since the early
1970s. These ratios are low by international standards. For
example, the average ratio ofprimary book capital to asset
in the US. was alittle under 6.7 percent in the first halfof
the 1980s (Keeley 1988). They are also low by Japan's own
historical standard: In the prewarperiod, bank own capital
13. See MorenoandKim (1993) for further details on window guidance
and related procedures.
14. For instance, strict entry restrictions limited the number of city
banks to a maximum 13 since 1953.
15. Own capital of a bank includes capital, legal reserves (capital
reserves and profit reserves), surplus accounts (voluntary reserves and
undistributedprofits), andprovisions for payment (reserve for loan loss,
retirement pension payment, etc.).
was about 20percentoftotal liabilities and totalcapital was
15 percent ofliabilities16 (Suzuki 1987, p. 193).
The regulatory environment affecting bank capital and
lending changed in the early 1980s in light ofinternational
concern about the weaker capital positions of, banking
institutions (Cooke, 1984). Aparticularlysignificantdevel-
opment was the concern expressed by US. regulators
about the low capitalratios ofJapanese banks expanding in
the U.S. market. For exalnple, in December 1983, the
Federal Reserve Board approved Fuji Bank's application to
acquire a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding corpora-
tion (Walter E. Heller International Corporation) in the
US. However, in its order, the Board observed that Fuji's
reportedcapitalratio was muchless thanthe 5percentratio
that applied to US. banks. The Board also raised "the
general question of whether the capital standards appli-
cable to domestic bank holding companies should also
be applied to foreign banking organizations making ac~
quisitions in the United States ..." (see Kareken 1984,
p.43-46).
The concern with harmonizing capital adequacy re-
quirements eventually resulted in the drafting of risk-
adjusted capital standards in Basle in December 1987.
These standards were formally adopted in July 1988. The
Basle capital adequacy standard requires that international
banks achieve an overall risk-adjusted capital-asset ratio
equal to at least8percent. 17The Accord provides arole for
both book as well as market value capital. Specifically,·at
leasthalfofthe overall 8percentratio mustconsistofTierI
capital, which includes shareholders' equity and retained
earnings. The balance can be metby Tier II capital, which
can include subordinated debt, preferred shares, and hid-
den reserves, that is, unrealized gains on.stockholding. To·
allow for its relatively risky nature, banks are allowed
to countonly up to 45 percentofunrealizedgains as hidden
reserves.
16. To be sure, the book value capital to assetratio wouldunderstate the
market value capital to asset ratio to the extent that stock prices have
been appreciating throughout mostofthe postwarperiod. However, this
effect is likely to have been significant only towards the second half of
the 1980s, when the regulatory environmenthad already shifted towards
more stringent capital standards. According to a recent BOJ study
(Shinagawa, 1993), hidden reserves representedover2Yz times the value
ofbanks' own capital when the Nikkei stock index reached its peakin
the fall of 1989.
17. The initial plan for the risk-based capital standards was proposed in
1986 and the Accord itself was reached among the Group ofTen
countries in July 1988. The deadline for Japanese banks was March 31,
1993.36 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
Questionsfor Empirical Analysis
Our review of the institutional features of the Japanese
financial system and the process of regulatory change
poses the following questions for empirical analysis.
First, does Japanese banklendingincreaseinresponseto
anincrease in the stockprice, as predictedby eitherview of
the relationship between stockpriceandlending(thatstock
price changes affect loan demand or loan supply)? This
question will be addressed by examining the dynamic
response ofbank lending to innovations in the stock price.
Second, how significant is the effect ofstock prices on
bank lending and has this relationship changed over time?
To address these questions, we proceed in three steps:
(i) we examine themagnitude ofimpulse responses tounit
shocks in the stock price; (ii) we assess the predictive
ability of stock prices for bank lending according to ex-
clusion restrictions and variance decompositions; (iii) we
compare the magnitude ofthe response ofbank lending to
stock prices and the ability of stock prices to predict
lending (according to exclusion restrictions and variance
decompositions) over the sample periods 1970.1-1983.12
and1984.1-1993.5.
Third, have fluctuations in Nikkei been important in
explaining specific recent episodes of loan expansion or
contraction? This question will be addressed by perform-
ing a historical decomposition of the forecast error in
lending that allows us to determine the sources of loan
fluctuations over the two samples.
ID. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The Model andEstimation
To address the empirical questions, we estimate a VAR
modelforJapanthatincludesmacroeconomicvariablesthat
may beexpectedtoaffectlendingas wellasthe Nikkei. The
model may be expressed compactly as follows:
A(L)Zt = ut
whereA(L)is amatrix ofpolynomials inthe lagoperator, Zt
= [it Yt Pt it St]' in which it = bank loans, Yt = industrial
production, Pt = consumer price index, it = call money
rate, and St = Nikkei stock average, and Ut is a vector
of residuals that may be contemporaneously correlated.
While the primary focus of this paper is the relationship
between the Nikkei stock price and bank lending, the in-
clusion ofindustrial production, the consumer price index
and the call money rate is meant to control for cyclical
factors that might affect bank lending.
To identifY orthogonalized innovations in each of the
variables and the dynamic responses to such innovations
we factor the variance-covariance matrix ofthe VAR using
the Choleski decomposition to obtain the moving average
representation:
Zt = A(L)-l BB-1ut = C(L)Et
where the variables in Zt are entered in the order described
earlier, Et, = [Elf EZt E3t E 4t ESt] and E1t to ESt respectively
refer to orthogonalized innovations in bank loans, output,
.....1 • C'lJ... .............. +0......... ;_...~...'OC'l... ....",+.OC' n_rl s..._nolr --: el" goouS pnces, ~l1Vll..-",vl1l1 lULvl\.l13l. la"\.113 allU LlJ\".J.\.. pJ.H. 13.
This ordering assumes that lending is contemporaneously
unaffectedby all the othervariables inthe system, whereas
the stock price is affected by all these variables.
To estimate the model, data were collected for Japan
overthe period1970.1-1993.5, whichspans the years after
Japan's "high growth period." Data and sources are de-
scribed in the Appendix. The model was estimated over
two subsamples, 1970.1-1983.12 and 1984.1-1993.5. As
thereis no reasontoexpectthat any effectstockprices have
on loan demand changed over the full period, the sample
was broken to attempt to see how the changes in Japan's
regulatory environment may have affected the relationship
between stock prices and lending. While the choice of a
date to break the sample is to some extent arbitrary, an
effort was made to pick a date when Japanese banks
became aware thatcapital adequacy was assuming priority
in the minds ofregulators, which wouldtend to strengthen
the links between stock price changes and total lending.
Plausible dates include 1984.1, the month afterthe Federal
Reserve Board openly expressed concern about the capital
adequacy of foreign banks in its approval of a Fuji Bank
acquisition in the U.S., 1987.12, when the Basle risk-
adjusted capital standards agreement was drafted, and
1988.7, when the standards were officially adopted. The
date 1984.1 was selected, as it allows enough degrees of
freedom to strengthen confidence in the results.
Unit root tests provide mixed evidence that the data in
the model are non-stationary over the period 1970.1-
1993.5.18 To account for such possible non-stationarity,
the VAR model was estimated using the first difference
ofthe logs ofthe variables (with the exception ofthe call
money rate, where the first difference was used). Lag
lengths were set at 9 in the first subsample and 7 in the
second subsample. At these lag lengths, the null hypothe-
sis ofresidual white noise could not be rejected according
to the Qstatistic.
18. Tests for unitroots areperformedoverthefull period1970.1-1993.5
because they attempt to identify long-run properties ofthe data that are
not wellcapturedby the smallersubsamples. The Phillips-Perrontest (16
lags) fails to reject the unit root null for all the series in levels. However,
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (12 lags) rejects the unit root null
for the call money rate at 1% and for industrial production at 5%.KIM AND MORENOI JAPAN: STOCK PRICES AND BANK LENDING 37
Dynamic Responses to Shocks
To assess the qualitative responses to shocks, Figure 1
reports the dynamic responses to innovations in the Nikkei
stock price over the two subsamples. As expected, the
response of loans to innovations in the stock price is
positive.
Figure 1revealsthattwofeatures distinguishtheresponse
of loans to Nikkei innovations over the two subsamples.
First, the magnitude of the response of loans to Nikkei
innovations is much smaller in the first period than in
the second. Second, the response of loans is temporary
in the first period and permanent in the second. The
smaller response in the first sample is consistent with the
interpretation offered earlier, namely, that the ability of
banks to obtain funding from the BOJ reduced the impor-
tanceofcapitalconstraintsonlendingbehavior. The transi-
tory nature ofthe response in the first period suggests that
windowguidancemay have effectivelyconstrainedlending
decisions.
To conserve space, other impulse responses are not
illustrated here. However, to facilitate interpretation ofthe
historical decomposition later on, it is v/orth surruY}1arizing
some of the responses of lending to innovations in other
variables in the second sample period, when stock price
effects are important. In this period, lending rises perma-
nently in response to its own innovations as well as to
FIGUREl
innovations in the Nikkei stockprice. Lendingfalls perma-
nently in response to innovations in the call money rate,
industrial production, and the CPI.
The qualitative responses of lending to innovations in
the Nikkei stock price, lending, or the call money rate do
not clarify whether such responses reflect change-s in loan
demand orloan supply. It is also apparent that the counter-
cyclical response of lending to macroeconomic activity
(industrial production and Cpr) is inconsistent with a
change in loan demand. However, itmay reflect changes in
loan supply that in turn reflect monetary policy. This last
interpretation is supported (or at least not contradicted)
by the fact that interest rates also rise (temporarily)
in response to innovations in industrial production and
the CPJ.l9
19. In isolation, the rise in interest rate in response to innovations in
industrial production and the cpr may be interpreted as reflecting
increased demand. Together with a contraction in loan demand, how-
ever, it suggests thatacountercyclicalpolicyresponsehas takenplace. It
is worth stressing, however, that innovations in interest rates or in
aggregates such as lending cannot necessarily be interpreted as innova-
tions in monetary policy over this period. See Moreno and Kim (1993).
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Exclusion Restrictions
and Variance Decompositions
The importance of the various innovations in influencing
lending will be apparent from the tests ofpredictive ability
and the historical decomposition.20 Table 1 reports the
marginal significance levels of tests of exclusion restric-
tions on the lagged variables ofthe VAR model for the loan
equation and the decomposition of the variance of the
forecast error oflending at various forecast horizons. As
can be seen, according to the exclusion restrictions, the
Nikkei is apoor predictoroflending in the first subsample,
1970.1-1983.12, and a good predictor in the second sub-
sample 1984.1-1993.5. Inthe secondsample, thehypothe-
sis that lagged changes in the Nikkei stock price do not
affectbank lendingis rejected at the 1percentlevel. This is
consistent with our findings that the response oflending to
innovations of the stock price was small and temporary in
the first subsample, and larger and more persistent in the
second sUbsample.
Asimilarimpressionis conveyedby the variance decom-
positions. According to Table 1, at a two-year horizon,
innovations in the stockprice accounted for about 1percent
ofthe variance of the forecast error oflending in the first
sample period, and 28 percent in the second sample. The
success ofthe stock price as apredictor ofloan behavior is
remarkable, because in a four-variable VAR model that
excludes stock prices, lending is predicted largely by its
own lags. Thus, it appears that stock prices have had an
important effect on loan behavior since the mid-1980s.
The VAR methodology used here does not allow us to
determine whether stock prices affect loan supply or loan
demand. However, the stock price exerts an influence on
bank lending after a significant change in the regulatory
regime that placed greateremphasis on the capitalposition
of banks. This suggests that the effect of changes in the
stockprice on Japanese banklending atleastpartlyreflects
the impacton loan supply. The view thatloan supply effects
may have been important is supported by the large magni-
tude of fluctuations in hidden reserves associated with
fluctuations in stock prices. At the same time, the fact that
stock prices do not predict lending prior to the mid-1980s
suggests that any effects of stock prices on loan demand
have historically been weak. 2I
20. The responses of other variables to the stock price suggest that
innovations in the stock price reflect pennanent supply shocks. The
nominal interest rate, industrial production and the stock price rise
pennanentlyin response to astockprice innovation. The response ofthe
CPI is small and erratic, initially falling, and then tending to rise.
21. We also ran a similar model for the U.S., where banks do not hold
equity capital and hence any stock price effects would be through loan
TABLE 1
TESTS OF EXCLUSION RESTRICTIONS FOR LoAN
EQUATIONS AND VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF THE
FORECAST ERROR IN LENDING
EXCLUSION VARIANCE
RESTRICTIONS DECOMPosrrION
70.1-83.12 84.1-93.5 70.1-83.12 84.1-93.5
Horizons (months)
12 24 36 12 24 36
LENDING 4.0xlO-8 6.9 X10-8 91 84 80 57 49 44
INT. RATE 0.5 0.5 1 2 1 0 1 2
OUTPUT 0.1 4.2x 10-3 4 12 17 27 11 15
CPI 0.7 2.2x 10-2 0 0 1 11 10 10
NIKKEI 0.4 9.2X 10-7 4 1 0 25 28 29
NOTE: Totals may not sum to 100 because ofrounding.
The Nikkei's Contribution during Episodes
ofLoan Expansion and Contraction
To assess the Nikkei's contributionto loanbehavior, we use
the estimated coefficients to compute the forecast error in
lending at atwo-yearhorizon. Alargeforecast errormeans
that lending was unexpectedly large or small, given the
information available at the time the forecast was being
made. Ahistorical decomposition can be performed (using
the coefficients ofthe moving average representationofthe
model) to determine the contribution of (orthogonalized)
innovations in each ofthe components ofthe model to this
forecast error. One advantage of this approach is that it
controls for factors other than the Nikkei that may account
for sluggish loan growth, including output.
Figures 2 and 3report historical decompositions for the
first and second subsamples respectively. (Note that some
observations are lost in setting a 24-month forecast hori-
zon.) Inspection of the figures indicates that in the first
sample, a number of episodes involved relatively large
"surprises" (forecast errors) in lending-positive errors
around the time of the first oil shock and in 1982; and
negativeerrors in 1975,1977, and 1981. These episodes are
largely attributable to unexpected innovations in lending.
The exception is 1977, when unusually sluggish loan
growth occurred in response to innovations in output. The
Nikkei appeared to make some contribution to the large
positiveforecast errors in lending in theearly 1970s and the
subsequent contraction, but this contribution was very
small in relative terms.
demand. We found that the stock price has little or no influence on bank
lending. The U.S. evidence therefore suggests that the effects of the
stock price on loan demand are unimportant.KIM AND MORENO/ JAPAN: STOCK PRICES AND BANK LENDING 39
FIGURE 2
HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION OF THE FORECAST ERROR IN LENDING
(SAMPLE 1970.1-1983.12)
FORECAST ERROR (24-MONTHS) PORTION CAUSED BY: OUTPUT
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FIGURE 3
HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION OF THE FORECAST ERROR IN LENDING
(SAMPLE 1984.1-1993.12)
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Thesecondhistoricaldecomposition is ofmore immedi-
ate interest, as it helps shed light on the factors that have
affectedrecent loanbehaviorinJapan. We observepositive
forecast errors (unusually robust lending) in 1986-1987
and 1990, and negative forecast errors (unusually weak
lending) in 1988-1989 and 1991-1992.
Rapid loan growth in 1986 and 1987, and slower loan
growth in 1988 and 1989 are in part attributable to fluctua-
tions in output. As discussed previously, the response of
lending to output fluctuations is negative in the second
sample, so these loan movements may reflect the effects of
countercyclical monetary policy. In particular, this histor-
ical decomposition is consistent with statements by the
Japanese Ministry of Finance (1993, p. 6) that monetary
conditions eased between 1986 and 1987. However, the
historical decomposition suggests monetary tightening be-
gan in 1988, whereas policy actions that might reflect
tightening (such as increases in the official discount rate)
only became apparent in 1989 or 1990. Thus, some care
needs to betakenininterpreting theresponses oflendingto
output as entirely reflecting countercyclical policy.
Starting in 1989, a larger portion ofthe forecast error in
lending is due to its own innovations. Innovations in the
Nikkei account for little ofrobust lending in 1986-1987,
but they make a distinct positive contribution in 1989-
1990. Innovations inthe Nikkeihave contractionaryeffects
in 1988-1989, and 1991-1992. In particular, the recent
episodeofsluggishgrowth inlending appears to belargely
associated with negative innovations in lending and in the
Nikkei stock price.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding empirical analysis allows us to shed some
light on certain characteristics of the relationship be-
tween the Nikkei stock price and bank lending in Japan.
First, the response ofJapanesebanklending to an increase
in the stock price is positive in the two sample periods
(1970.1-1983.12 and 1984.1-1993.5) examined in this
paper. This result is intuitive and is consistent with the
stock price affecting loan demand or loan supply.
Second, there has been a change in the historical rela-
tionship between stock prices and bank.lending. This
relationship was weak until about the mid-1980s, but
became quite significant subsequently.
Third, recent fluctuations in the Nikkei stock price
appear to have contributed significantly to fluctuations in
banklending inJapan. In particular, the Nikkei stockprice
appears to have played an important role in accounting for
the recent sluggish growth in lending in Japan.
While the techniques used in this paper do not allow us
directly to isolate the effects of the stock price on loan
demand and loan supply, the stockpriceappears toexertan
influence on Japanese banklending following a significant
change in the regulatory regime that placed greater em-
phasis on the capital position ofbanks. This suggests that
the effect ofchanges in the stock price on Japanese bank
lending at least partly reflect their impact on loan supply.
At the same time, the weak relationship between stock
prices andlendingpriorto the mid-1980s suggests thatany
effects of stock prices on loan dema.lld have historically
been weak. However, Japan's recent cyclical downturn is
quite unusual, so we cannotrule outthe possibility that the
stock price has affected loan demand without further
analysis.
Future research in two directions may shed further light
on the relationship between stock prices and lending and
the factors that underlie such a relationship: (i) develop-
ing structural models that distinguish explicitly between
the loan demand and loan supply effects of stock prices;
(ii) isolating the role of other asset prices, notably land
prices, in influencing bank lending.42 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 1
ApPENDIX
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Consumer Price Index, Seasonally Adjusted. Index of
consumerprices covering the whole countryexcluding
single-person households and those engaged mainly
in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Base year is
1985. Seasonally adjusted by Federal Reserve Bankof
San Francisco staffusing X-11 filter. Source: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis-
tics (IFS).
Industrial Production, Seasonally Adjusted. Index of
monthly production by 9 mining and 523 manufactur-
ing industries, weighted by 1985 value-added data.
Base year is 1985. Seasonally adjusted by Federal
Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco staffusing X-11 filter.
Source: IFS.
Call Money Rate. Rate in interbank call money market.
Source: Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank ofJapan.
Nikkei stock price index. Composite for 255 Companies.
Monthly averages. Source: Economic Statistics
Monthly, Bank ofJapan.
Bank Loans, Seasonally Adjusted. Total loans and dis-
counts, all banks to nonbank sector. Seasonally ad-
justed by Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco staff
using X-11 filter. Source:EconomicStatisticsMonthly,
Bank ofJapan.
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